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Abstract: 
Previous feedback system research in a variety of contexts has focused on the impact that ratings (as proxies for 
quality) have on a variety of social and economic outcomes with equivocal findings. These mixed findings may be 
partially due to noise (factors not related to quality) embedded in aggregated or average positive and negative ratings.
One significant source of ratings noise may come from culturally diverse raters’ issuing ratings in virtual environments.
Culture impacts how groups of individuals are socialized to behave and think, which may result in members’ having 
different attitudes towards publicly downgrading (negative ratings) or praising (positive ratings) other members in the
feedback system. In this paper, I investigate how culture influences rating practices specifically in public electronic 
knowledge sharing communities. Using a cross-nested hierarchical linear model, I demonstrate empirically that cultural 
differences at the community, occupation, and national levels interact in unique ways to increase or decrease an 
individual’s propensity to give and receive a positive or a negative rating. My study contributes to the literature on rating 
systems along with having practical ramifications for the designers of feedback systems. 
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1 Introduction 
Feedback systems1 have been implemented in many different types of websites from electronic commerce 
websites such as eBay and Amazon to user-generated content websites such as Reddit and Youtube. Much 
of the literature on online feedback systems has focused on explaining the impact that ratings (as proxies 
for quality) have on a variety of social and economic outcomes (Ba & Pavlou, 2002; Chen, Xu, & Whinston, 
2011; Chevalier & Mayzlin, 2006; Dellarocas, 2006; Godes & Silva, 2012; Pavlou & Dimoka, 2006; Poston 
& Speier, 2005; Son, Tu, & Benbasat, 2006). Unfortunately, this prior literature has reported mixed results 
whereby sometimes the impact of ratings is positive, negative, or not significant (Ba & Pavlou, 2002; Ghose, 
Smith, & Telang, 2006; Kauffman & Wood, 2005). These equivocal findings may be partially due to noise 
(factors not related to quality) embedded in aggregated or average positive and negative ratings (Moe & 
Trusov, 2011; Muchnik, Aral, & Taylor, 2013; Schlosser, 2005). 
At least in theory, ratings should be a somewhat objective indication of the quality of the product, service, 
or user-generated content being rated, which prior literature often assumes is the case (Fichman, 2011; 
Sun, 2012). Prior research, however, has offered minimal empirical evidence supporting or contradicting 
this quality assumption. If ratings are noisy (measuring factors not related to quality), then it poses a 
significant problem for all types of information consumers who use these ratings to make important decisions 
(Aral, 2014). For instance, tutorials in online learning environments such as www.dreamincode.net, 
www.stackoverflow.com, or www.codeproject.com rated for personal, social, and cultural factors not related 
to the quality of the tutorial can cause learners to learn poor or invalid ideas related to the content of the 
tutorial. Therefore, we need to understand the factors (variables) in addition to or instead of quality that are 
involved in ratings. Researchers can use these factors to statistically tease out the portion of the ratings that 
are based on quality when investigating the impact of ratings, which may help explain the prior contradictory 
findings. Information consumers can use these factors to wade through the noise embedded in ratings in 
order to extract the actionable and useful portion of the ratings. 
One potentially significant source of ratings noise may come from culturally diverse raters’ issuing ratings 
in virtual environments. On eBay, for instance, consumers from all over the world provide ratings on 
marketplace participants, and, on www.stackexchange.com, raters from many different national and 
occupational cultures rate practice-related answers and industry commentary. However, with cultural 
diversity comes different thought patterns, values, and culturally defined norms among the different raters 
(Gallagher & Savage, 2013; Koh, Kim, Butler, & Bock, 2007; O'Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991; Rui & 
Stefanone, 2013; Schein, 2010; Triandis, 1994). These differences may adversely influence rating practices 
(i.e., an individual’s propensity to give positive or negative ratings) in feedback systems, because culture 
plays an important role in determining how groups of individuals are socialized to behave and think (O'Reilly 
et al., 1991; Qiu, Lin, & Leung, 2013). Certain cultures socialize their members to embrace or avoid conflict 
and to have different levels of respect for authority (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 2000), which may result in 
members’ having different attitudes towards publicly downgrading (negative ratings) or praising (positive 
ratings) other members in the feedback system. Therefore, ratings may be subject to a cultural bias, which 
means that aggregated or average ratings may not be an objective measure of actual quality. 
In this paper, I specifically address the following research question: 
RQ:  How does culture influence individuals’ propensity to give and receive positive or negative ratings 
in online feedback systems? 
I specifically address this research question in the context of ratings in public electronic knowledge sharing 
communities using archival data of actual ratings in their feedback system. Public electronic knowledge 
sharing communities are virtual social structures focused on solving and discussing domain-specific 
problems concerning a skill-based craft or profession (Boland & Tenkasi, 1995; Earl, 2001; Murillo, 2011; 
Wasko & Faraj, 2005). Ratings in these websites are important for both the knowledge seeker and the 
knowledge contributor. For the knowledge seeker, noisy ratings may result in the learning of unsound 
practices concerning the skill-based craft due to the poor signal that the noisy ratings provide (Cheng & 
Vassileva, 2005). For the knowledge contributor, highly knowledgeable content contributors may stop 
contributing due to other members’ not rating their high-quality contributions’ positively or even rating them 
negatively (Lampe & Resnick, 2004). Therefore, in order to maximize the effectiveness of ratings for both 
                                                     
1 There are many different types of feedback systems, which are also commonly referred to as rating systems, reputation systems, or 
moderation systems. Some systems allow rating on a continuous scale (Amazon’s star rating system as of July 2016) and others 
enable rating in a binary thumb up (positive) and thumb down (negative) manner (YouTube and Slashdot as of July 2016). 
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knowledge seekers and contributors, we need to understand the behavioral antecedents (above, beyond, 
or instead of contribution quality) of ratings in feedback systems in order to minimize any noise associated 
with ratings. 
In this paper, I propose that culture at the national, occupational, and community levels interact in unique 
ways to create a significant source of noise in positive and negative ratings. I argue that positive and 
negative ratings in feedback systems serve as mechanisms to reinforce national and occupational cultural 
similarities and differences between community members and to enforce the community’s interactive 
culture, which distracts raters from objectively rating content based on the quality of the contribution. In 
addition to these main effects associated with culture, I further propose that certain cultural attributes may 
have a qualifying (moderating) effect on other factors such as contribution quality. In this manner, a rating 
is a complex social and cultural phenomenon whereby raters rate social and cultural attributes of the 
member contributing content in conjunction with or in some cases instead of characteristics of the 
contribution, which may create significant noise (non-quality indicators) in the overall ratings. I provide 
empirical evidence supporting these cultural effects using a series of cross-nested hierarchical linear models 
with a sample of the ratings from a large public electronic sharing community of software developers. 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Online Ratings 
Much of the literature specifically devoted to online feedback systems in a variety of virtual contexts has 
focused on explaining the impact that ratings have on promoting a variety of outcomes such as price 
premiums and trust in electronic commerce environments (Ba & Pavlou, 2002; Chevalier & Mayzlin, 2006; 
Clemons, Gao, & Hitt, 2006; Dellarocas, 2006; Pavlou & Dimoka, 2006; Son et al., 2006), consumer 
purchase errors (Godes & Silva, 2012), decision quality and time (Poston & Speier, 2005), and effort to 
contribute content in user-generated content websites (Chen et al., 2011). Unfortunately, this prior literature 
has reported mixed empirical results whereby sometimes the impact of ratings is positive, negative, or not 
significant (Ba & Pavlou, 2002; Ghose et al., 2006; Kauffman & Wood, 2005). 
These unclear findings may be, in part, because ratings are noisy, which means that there are factors not 
related to quality embedded in aggregated or average positive and negative ratings (Moe & Trusov, 2011; 
Muchnik et al., 2013; Schlosser, 2005). Yet, prior empirical research that has focused on explaining the 
impact of ratings (more broadly than public electronic knowledge sharing communities) has not statistically 
controlled for the non-quality portion of ratings. Not controlling for these factors is problematic because the 
theoretical logic for predicting a positive impact of ratings often relies heavily on the assumption that ratings 
are highly correlated with quality (Kauffman & Wood, 2005). Prior literature, however, has not offered many 
theoretical explanations for what factors (variables) in addition to or instead of contribution quality are 
involved in individuals’ giving and receiving a positive or negative rating, which makes statistically teasing 
out the effect of quality particularly difficult when evaluating the impact of accumulated ratings. 
Of the limited research that has investigated why something (product, service, answer, response, or other 
form of user-generated content) receives a positive or negative rating online, the literature offers two primary 
explanations: 1) ratings are (more or less) an objective indicator of quality and 2) future ratings are subject 
to an anchoring and resulting Matthew effect. First, prior research has theorized or assumed that ratings 
are indicators of quality (Fichman, 2011; Sun, 2012). The underlying logic behind this conjecture is that 
crowds of individuals have the ability to make quality determinations or make decisions more accurately 
than experts even though the individuals in the crowd may use their own criteria and non-standardized 
processes to make ratings (Surowiecki, 2004). However, the fact that each individual in the crowd may come 
to a quality decision using different criteria or different processes does not mean that each individual comes 
inaccurate or different conclusions (Gao, Greenwood, Agarwal, & McCullough, 2015; Schultz, Mouritsen, & 
Gabrielsen, 2001). 
Second, prior research has theorized that existing ratings may provide a positive or a negative anchor for 
future ratings (Li & Hitt, 2008; Moe & Trusov, 2011; Muchnik et al., 2013; Schlosser, 2005; Waguespack & 
Sorenson, 2011; Zhao & Zhou, 2011). These anchors create a Matthew effect whereby the rich get richer 
(positive anchors) and the poor get poorer (negative anchors) (Merton, 1968). In other words, a highly 
ranked product, service, answer, contribution, or individual will have a higher likelihood of receiving 
additional high ratings and vice versa for poorly ranked products, services, or individuals through a process 
of differential association (DiPrete & Eirich, 2006; Gould, 2002; Merton, 1968). In the context of a public 
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electronic knowledge sharing community where members rank and compare other members based on 
accumulated ratings in the feedback system, anchoring can adversely impact ratings associated with a 
specific contribution (post), a specific contributor (individual), or both. These anchoring effects may bias 
future ratings in either a positive or a negative direction, which creates noise in the overall evaluation of the 
post—especially if the initial ratings are not true indications of quality. 
Prior literature on feedback systems has not theoretically or empirically investigated other sources of noise 
associated with online ratings besides this theorized anchoring effect. One potentially confounding (but not 
yet studied) factor relates to culture. Particularly in public electronic knowledge sharing communities, culture 
may have a significant impact on ratings because these electronic social structures have members from all 
over the world with many different industry backgrounds. This cultural diversity means that individuals who 
interact in the virtual environment have different thought patterns, values, and culturally defined norms 
(Gallagher & Savage, 2013; Koh et al., 2007; O'Reilly et al., 1991; Rui & Stefanone, 2013; Schein, 2010; 
Triandis, 1994). For example, it may be disrespectful for individuals socialized in certain cultures to 
negatively rate a high-status individual even if the contribution warrants a negative rating, whereas it may 
be considered acceptable behavior for individuals socialized in other cultures due to cultural differences 
related to social inequalities. Similarly, certain cultures have a tendency to avoid conflict (Triandis, 2000), 
which may impact individuals’ tendency to give a negative rating because a negative rating may be 
considered a conflict generating behavior. Therefore, ratings may be subject to a variety of cultural biases, 
which makes aggregated or average ratings less likely to be objective measures of quality in these culturally 
diverse settings. 
2.2 Culture 
In this paper, I broadly define culture as “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes one 
group or category of people from another” (Hofstede & Bond, 1988, p. 51). Hofstede and Bond (1988) use 
this metaphor to refer to different groups being coded (programmed) via social, political, and economic 
means (modules) to process information and make sense of the world differently. Culture may be delimited 
at (among others) the community, occupation, and national levels. Researchers have typically defined a 
community’s culture in terms of a community’s interaction style and assumptions concerning what is 
acceptable and unacceptable conduct in the specific community’s context (Eliasoph & Lichterman, 2003; 
Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 2000). Occupational culture refers to the values, ideologies, and beliefs in certain 
crafts or professions such as the law, medicine, aviation, and technology (Trice, 1993). National culture 
refers to ideological and values’ differences at the nation state level. Information systems research has most 
commonly used Hofstede’s dimensions of national culture (power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism-collectivism, masculinity-femininity, long-term orientation, and indulgence) to measure 
national culture (Kappos & Rivard, 2008; Leidner & Kayworth, 2006).2 
Culture at each one of these levels of analysis plays an important role in determining how individuals are 
socialized to behave and think (Eliasoph & Lichterman, 2003; O'Reilly et al., 1991; Qiu et al., 2013; Triandis, 
1972; Trice, 1993). In the online community literature, prior research has used culture (particularly at the 
national level) to critically examine and question the universality of individual behaviors by arguing that 
individuals from different cultures can be expected to exhibit different types of behaviors in electronic social 
structures (Gallagher & Savage, 2013). For instance, prior online community research has demonstrated 
significant cross-cultural differences in terms of the types of information that individuals are willing to share 
(Ardichvili, Maurer, Li, Wentling, & Stuedemann, 2006; Li, 2010; Siau, Erickson, & Nah, 2010), membership 
motivators (Madupu & Cooley, 2010; Shin, 2010), attitudes towards privacy (Marshall, Cardon, Norris, 
Goreva, & D'Souza, 2008; Pflug, 2011; Posey, Lowry, Roberts, & Ellis, 2010), and membership continuance 
behaviors (Chiou & Lee, 2008; Grace-Farfaglia, Dekkers, Sundararajan, Peters, & Park, 2006; Pfeil, 
Zaphiris, & Ang, 2006). 
I build off these previous online cultural studies by proposing that cultural differences at the national, 
occupation, and community levels interact in unique ways to increase or decrease individuals’ propensity to 
positively or negatively rate a contribution. Particularly in public electronic knowledge sharing communities, 
understanding what aggregated or average ratings in the feedback system mean requires understanding 
                                                     
2 According to Hofstede (2001): 1) power distance refers to the extent to which a culture accepts status inequalities; 2) uncertainty 
avoidance refers to a culture’s acceptance of ambiguous or uncertain situations; 3) individualism-collectivism is the degree of 
interdependence a society maintains among its members; 4) masculinity-femininity refers to a cultures competitiveness such as 
wanting to be the best (masculinity) or caring for others (femininity); 5) long-term orientation refers to how a culture balances its past 
with the challenges of the present or future; 6) indulgence refers to the extent to which a culture tries to control their impulses. 
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the national culture of the membership, the occupational culture (and subcultures) that the electronic social 
structure is situated in, and the interactive culture of the electronic social structure. Therefore, I propose that 
a rating is a complex social and cultural phenomenon whereby raters rate social and cultural attributes of 
the contributing member’s culture in conjunction with or in some cases instead of the characteristics of the 
contribution itself because culture plays an important role in determining how individuals behave and think 
(O'Reilly et al., 1991; Qiu et al., 2013). 
3 Research Model 
In this paper, I theorize about how members use feedback systems in public knowledge sharing 
communities (i.e., actual ratings) and not system non-usage (i.e., members’ choosing not to rate a 
contribution). A member may choose not to rate a given contribution (i.e., system non-usage) for a similar 
or a different set of factors than the variables I propose in this paper. If a member chooses to rate a 
contribution, then the rating options will either be binary (positive or negative) or along a continuous scale. 
In all cases, a negative rating is the opposite of a positive rating (i.e., likelihood that a rating will be positive 
or negative (binary systems) or likelihood that a rating will be closer to the top (positive) or bottom (negative) 
end of a continuous scale). I frame all hypotheses in relation to negative ratings (see Figure 1) because 
prior research indicates that negative ratings have a much stronger impact on a variety of outcomes 
(Chevalier & Mayzlin, 2006) and that negative ratings are much less common (Chevalier & Mayzlin, 2006; 
Dellarocas & Wood, 2008; Hu, Pavlou, & Zhang, 2009). 
Figure 1. Research Model 
3.1 Community Culture 
Eliasoph and Lichterman (2003, p. 737) define a community’s culture as “recurrent patterns of interaction 
that arise from a group’s shared assumptions about what constitutes good or adequate participation in the 
group setting”, which they refer to as culture-in-interaction. They postulate that a community’s culture-in-
interaction comprises three dimensions: 1) group boundaries (the group's relationship to the wider world), 
2) group bonds (members' mutual responsibilities), and 3) speech (communication) norms (appropriate 
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communication patterns). Although they define these concepts in relation to offline groups, there are roles, 
responsibilities, communication patterns, and normative expectations for community members whether 
those interactions occur online or offline (Chen et al., 2011; De Cindio, Gentile, Grew, & Redolfi, 2003; 
Welser, Gleave, & Fisher, 2007), which makes a group’s culture-in-interaction relevant to all types of offline 
and online collectives. Furthermore, Eliasoph and Lichterman’s (2003) model provides a granular and 
flexible framework to evaluate a virtual community’s interactive culture. The virtual community’s interactive 
culture (culture-in-interaction) provides the baseline set of social and cultural norms that raters may use to 
evaluate, contextualize, and rate online contributions. 
Different virtual communities may develop a unique culture-in-interaction. For example, Reddit has a rather 
unique chaotic culture (Massanari, 2013), Twitter has a distinctive sharing culture surrounding the retweet 
(Murthy, 2013), and the now defunct Digg had a culture that was a unique blend of individualism and 
participation (Germonprez & Hovorka, 2013). Therefore, what is considered acceptable behavior varies from 
website to website because their interactive cultures differ. For example, certain deviant behaviors such as 
name calling or the use of crude language might be consistent with the group bonds and communication 
norms in one virtual community such as www.4chan.com (general discussion forum), but these types of 
behaviors might violate the group bonds and communication norms in another virtual community such as 
www.codeproject.com (public knowledge sharing community of software developers). Websites such as 
www.stackoverflow.com (public knowledge sharing community of software developers) have an interactive 
culture that strongly discourages off-topic posts (group bond), whereas similar websites such as 
www.dreamincode.net and www.codeproject.com have different group bonds concerning off-topic posts. 
Regardless of the website’s culture-in-interaction, violating any dimension of it (i.e., post written using proper 
English at www.4chan.com, an excessive use of emoticons in contributions at www.codeproject.com, or off-
topic posts at www.stackoverflow.com) makes the contribution stand out in a negative manner, which may 
increase the likelihood that the post will receive a negative rating relative to a positive rating because culture-
in-interaction violations negatively impact how others in the group view the violator (Eliasoph & Lichterman, 
2003). Eliasoph and Lichterman (2003) demonstrate empirically that members who violate any dimension 
of a community’s interactive culture are met with awkward silence or outright rejection from the other group 
members. Just as individuals perform better when they fit the organizational cultural of a company (O'Reilly 
et al., 1991), I propose that posts that fit or are aligned with a website’s culture-in-interaction will have a 
reduced likelihood of receiving negative ratings (i.e., those posts will perform better). 
Although Eliasoph and Lichterman (2003) made this conclusion in relation to offline groups, a wealth of 
existing literature supports the idea that online groups interacting in virtual environments behave similarly 
to offline groups (Jiang, Heng, & Choi, 2013). For instance, Yee, Bailenson, Urbanek, Chang, and Merget 
(2007) conclude that social interactions in online environments are governed by similar norms and 
interaction patterns as those in the physical world even though the mode of interaction differs. Additionally, 
McLaughlin and Vitak (2011) report that online social norm violations often resulted in similar patterns of 
social rejection as those that Eliasoph and Lichterman (2003) report, which suggests some level of 
generalizability to online collectives. 
H1: Contributions that violate a website’s culture-in-interaction will have a higher probability 
of receiving a negative rating. 
3.2 National and Occupational Cultural Differences 
Instead of having competing institutions that govern the ratings process as is typically the case with offline 
ratings (Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Fleischer, 2009; Hsu, Roberts, & Swaminathan, 2012; Waguespack & 
Sorenson, 2011), rating contributions in a public electronic knowledge sharing community may involve 
competing occupational and/or national cultures (Blanchard, 2008; Dholakia, Bagozzi, & Pearo, 2004;  
Stewart & Gosain, 2006). Generally, individuals are ethnocentric by nature, which means that they tend to 
think of their own culture (occupation or national) as the gold standard and other cultures as “good” only to 
the extent that they are similar to their own (Triandis, 1994, 2000). As such, individuals tend to have a sense 
of pride about their own culture, help members of their own cultures, and reject members from different 
cultures (Matsumoto & Hwang, 2011; Mork, Aanestad, Hanseth, & Grisot, 2008; Triandis, 1994). In this 
manner, dissimilarity increases negativity towards others and favoritism towards culturally similar others 
(O'Reilly et al., 1991; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Triandis, 2000). Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect 
raters to have a propensity to positively rate similar others and to negatively rate dissimilar others because 
a means of showing this type of favoritism is through ratings in a feedback system (Stewart, 2005). 
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Cultural similarities and differences along national and occupational boundaries form a basis for in-group 
and out-group comparisons (Rao & Ramachandran, 2011; Trice & Beyer, 1993; Yuki, 2003). Prior research 
in a variety of disciplines has demonstrated empirically that individuals tend to favor other members in their 
in-group while discriminating against members in their out-group (Brewer, 1979; Diehl, 1990; Tajfel, 1970; 
Turner, 1975). In this context, the source of in-group favoritism among social groups formed along national 
or occupational cultural boundaries may be the result of a desire to maintain reciprocal relationships with 
other in-group members and/or a desire to benefit the in-group as a whole (Brewer & Yuki, 2007; Buchan, 
Croson, & Dawes, 2002). For example, Barnett, Goodman, and Stewart (2012) argue in the context of open 
source software communities that individuals’ positively rating other individuals with a competing ideology 
is tantamount to negatively rating their own ideology. This explanation is logical because positively rating 
an individual with a competing ideology or competing occupational culture increases the social standing of 
not only the individual being rated but also the social group to which the ideology or occupational culture 
belongs (Barnett et al., 2012; Stewart & Gosain, 2006). 
In public electronic knowledge sharing communities such as www.dreamincode.net and 
www.codeproject.com, a visible flag icon associated with an individual’s national culture typically identifies 
an individual’s national culture and other visible icons such as a Microsoft, a Python, or a Linux logo identify 
an individual’s occupational (sub) cultures. These icons are typically prominently visible next to all 
contributions so raters can see these cultural attributes when making rating decisions. However, these group 
distinctions in online environments are more depersonalized than those in typical offline in-groups of close 
friends and out-groups of strangers, which makes them conceptually similar to minimal groups. A minimal 
group refers to a set of depersonalized social categories based on seemingly arbitrary category distinctions 
between in-groups and out-groups (Brewer, 1979; Brewer & Yuki, 2007) such as Java developers or .NET 
developers in a public electronic knowledge sharing community. Despite the apparent arbitrary nature of 
minimal groups, however, research has consistently shown the idea of in-group favoritism and out-group 
derogation to be evident across multiple cultures even without a strong personal interdependence among 
in-group members and even when the individuals in the minimal in-group and out-group do not directly 
interact or compete with each other (Brewer & Yuki, 2007; Wetherell, 1982; Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 
1999). 
One theoretical explanation for this mere categorization effect in minimal groups is that there is a social 
norm to align with one’s in-group classification regardless of the strength of the in-group classification (Hertel 
& Kerr, 2001; Wilder, 1986). The social norm is for members to show a distinct favoritism towards in-group 
members even when the in-group is based on depersonalized categories (Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992; 
Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). For instance, a public electronic knowledge sharing community of 
software developers may have a social norm for a minimal group of .NET developers to favor other .NET 
developers with positive ratings and disfavor out-group Java developers with negative ratings even though 
the developers may not know each other. The software development industry has a social norm for Microsoft 
and Oracle to exhibit some level of animosity towards each other, which creates a minimal group 
categorization of .NET (Microsoft) and Java (Oracle) developers. Although Raymond (1999) does not use 
the minimal group terminology, his research implies that commercial software developers have an unwritten 
norm to favor other commercial software developers and that a similar norm exists for open source software 
developers. This effect in minimal groups may not be as sharp as with more interdependent groups, but 
ample reported empirical evidence demonstrates that shared in-group membership in minimal groups 
provides a basis for individuals’ inferring relational connections even to relatively unknown others (Brewer 
& Yuki, 2007; Tajfel et al., 1971). 
H2: The greater the occupational cultural differences between the rater and the author of 
the contribution that is being rated, the higher the probability of a negative rating. 
H3: The greater the national cultural differences between the rater and the author of the 
contribution that is being rated, the higher the probability of a negative rating. 
3.3 Interaction of Culture-in-Interaction and Occupational Culture 
Given the minimal group nature of online categorizations in public electronic knowledge sharing 
communities, it may take some form of counter-normative behavior to intensify or activate the categorization 
effect (Hertel & Kerr, 2001). For instance, posting an answer to a discussion topic in “textspeak” (i.e., 
language that adopts a lot of abbreviations and slang) instead of in “proper” English when the culture-in-
interaction for the website is to use proper English might make the minimal group categorization more 
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pronounced. The counter-normative posting style (culture-in-interaction violation) may further activate the 
normative expectation for individual group members to show loyalty to one’s minimal group (Hertel & Kerr, 
2001; Wilder, 1986). Without the culture-in-interaction violation, the minimal group categorization effect may 
be less evident because the individual has less of a reason to seek out minimal similarities or differences 
between the members (Mullen et al., 1992; Tajfel et al., 1971). 
Furthermore, Triandis (1994) argues that behavioral predictability leads to familiarity and trust, while 
behavioral unpredictability often leads to group conflicts and tensions. Triandis (1994) made this observation 
in relation to offline cultures, but the social dynamics in online collectives and groups have become 
increasingly similar to offline interactions (Jiang et al., 2013; Yee et al., 2007). Prior virtual community and 
computer-mediated communication research has demonstrated that online discussion forums have social 
norms that are expected to be followed and not following them may result in flaming and stronger in-group 
identification (Kayany, 1998; Kim, 2011). Following the social norms and adhering to the forum’s culture-in-
interaction is a form of behavioral predictability (Lea, O'Shea, Fung, & Spears, 1992). However, once the 
social norms have been violated and the behaviors of the violators become more unpredictable, then the 
minimal in-group and out-group categorization becomes sharper (Kayany, 1998; Kim, 2011; Lea et al., 
1992). 
Therefore, small occupational cultural differences may be amplified (be more pronounced) in the presence 
of a culture-in-interaction violation because the culture-in-interaction violation may make small occupational 
cultural differences salient when they may otherwise have been unnoticeable due to behavioral 
predictability. For instance, if a post violates the community’s culture-in-interaction at www.codeproject.com, 
then programming ideology or paradigm differences between the rater and the contributor may become 
evident in light of the community culture violation. Without the community culture violation, these differences 
(minimal group categorizations) may have been otherwise unnoticeable. 
H4: A contribution that violates a website’s culture-in-interaction will amplify the impact that 
small occupational cultural differences have on the probability that the contribution will 
receive a negative rating. 
3.4 Interaction of Culture-In-Interaction Violations and Contribution Quality 
An objective rating in a feedback system is one that rates the contribution on its own merits while not being 
distracted or biased by any personal, social, or cultural factors. When raters rate contributions based 
primarily on quality, feedback systems serve as important mechanisms to filter out or separate the high-
quality knowledge contributors from the low-quality knowledge contributors (Lampe & Resnick, 2004; 
Preece & Shneiderman, 2009; Resnick, Kuwabara, Zeckhauser, & Friedman, 2000). The entire community 
(both knowledge seekers and knowledge contributors) benefits when high-quality contributions are 
objectively rewarded with positive ratings and low-quality contributions are punished with negative ratings 
(Cheng & Vassileva, 2005; Lampe & Resnick, 2004; Poston & Speier, 2005). However, this type of objective 
rating activity can be difficult to achieve due to individuals’ susceptibility to social forces and assorted 
cognitive biases that may be involved with rating contributions (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Thaler, 2015). 
Violating a website’s social and/or cultural norms serves as a distraction that can bias objective or rational 
decision making (Thaler, 2015). This idea is very noticeable in the review process for academic research, 
particularly in cross-disciplinary work. If, for instance, an academic scholar is reviewing or evaluating a 
research paper organized in a counter-normative manner (i.e., methodology first, then results, then study 
motivation, and then theory development), then it becomes more difficult to evaluate the quality of the 
science and the voracity of the paper’s findings. When the authors violate the presentation norm (paper 
organization) for that particular academic audience, then the evaluators will be much more likely to rate the 
authors’ paper negatively even if the science is of supreme quality. In other words, the rater, reviewer, or 
evaluator becomes biased or distracted by the counter-normative mode of presentation (Cialdini, 2003; 
Thaler, 2015). 
I propose that the same type of bias may happen online when raters evaluate contributions. For instance, if 
a member of a public electronic knowledge sharing community posts a three-paragraph answer that 
accurately answers a knowledge seeker’s question but the communication norm for this particular virtual 
community is to answer questions with only one or two sentences, then the cultural norm violation may 
distract the rater from objectively rating the contribution based on the quality of the response. In this case, 
the culture-in-interaction violation may bias the rater into not seeing the high-quality response, which may 
mitigate the impact of contribution quality on this particular rating. 
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H5: A contribution that violates a website’s culture-in-interaction will mitigate the impact of 
contribution quality on the probability that the contribution will receive a negative rating. 
3.5 Interaction of Power Distance and Contributor Matthew Effect 
Hofstede’s (1980) power distance dimension of national culture captures the extent to which a culture 
accepts status inequalities or, said differently, how much respect a culture has for power and authority. High 
power distance cultures such as Russia, India, and China have a high degree of respect for authority and 
accept status differences as a cultural norm, whereas low power distance cultures such as Australia, Israel, 
and Canada have a lower degree of respect for authority and do not accept status differences as a cultural 
norm (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 2000). Previous literature has primarily investigated the concept of power 
distance in offline environments where there is a face-to-face interaction in order to demonstrate status 
inequalities and the associated respect (or lack thereof) for authority among the individuals involved in the 
interaction (Kappos & Rivard, 2008; Leidner & Kayworth, 2006). However, researchers have also 
demonstrated that the idea of power distance is an important factor (albeit less pronounced) in determining 
online patterns of social interactions where individuals virtually interact in manners consistent with their 
power distant cultures (Ardichvili et al., 2006; Jackson & Wang, 2013; Zhang, 2013). For instance, in online 
learning environments, which are conceptually similar to public electronic knowledge sharing environments, 
Zhang (2013) qualitatively concluded that power distance had a distinct influence on how individuals 
interacted with others (peers and instructors) in the online learning setting. 
Both the online and the offline ratings’ literature have consistently found that existing ratings provide a 
positive or a negative anchor for future ratings, which leads to a Matthew effect for content contributors (Li 
& Hitt, 2008; Moe & Trusov, 2011; Muchnik et al., 2013; Schlosser, 2005; Waguespack & Sorenson, 2011; 
Zhao & Zhou, 2011). However, I propose that the power distance of the rater’s national culture will moderate 
this effect because individuals socialized in high power distance cultures have a greater tendency to act 
deferentially to those in high-status positions, whereas individuals socialized in low power distance cultures 
generally have less respect for those in high-status positions (Erez & Gati, 2004; Hofstede & Bond, 1988; 
Triandis, 2000). In a public electronic knowledge sharing community, high-status individuals are those 
members who have accumulated high scores (sum of positive ratings minus sum of negative ratings) in the 
feedback system (Lampe & Resnick, 2004; Stewart, 2005). In the feedback system, positively rating a high-
status individual is an act of deference, whereas negatively rating a high-status individual is an act of 
disrespect (Barnett et al., 2012; Stewart, 2005). Given that individuals from high power distance cultures 
have more respect for authority, then individuals socialized in these cultures should logically reward posts 
authored by high-status members of the community with more positive ratings relative to individuals 
socialized from low power distance cultures. Therefore, I propose that raters from high power distance 
cultures will have a greater likelihood of perpetuating the Matthew effect for contributions made by high-
status members of the community. 
To exemplify this proposed moderating effect, consider an example of a public electronic knowledge sharing 
community of academic researchers who range from assistant professors (low-status) to full professors 
(high-status) from a diverse set of cultural backgrounds. Further assume that a full professor posts an 
obviously wrong (low-quality) response that suggests that a researcher use an OLS regression to analyze 
non-negative count data. The power distance moderating hypothesis that I propose in this paper predicts 
that a rater from a low power distance culture such as Australia or Israel would have less difficulty negatively 
rating the full professor’s incorrect response relative to a rater from a high power distance culture because 
low power distance cultures view everyone as more or less equals, which would reduce the impact of the 
positive anchor that comes from the full professor’s high-status. However, a rater who comes from a high 
power distance culture such as Korea or Malaysia would have a greater likelihood of holding the high-status 
full professor in high esteem even in connection with the obviously wrong response. Therefore, I suggest 
that this rater would have a higher likelihood of positively rating the high-status full professor relative to a 
rater from a low power distance culture, which would amplify the positive anchor that stems from the 
contributor’s high-status. If a low-status assistant professor provided the above OLS response instead of 
the high-status full professor, then this moderating hypothesis would predict that the rater from the high 
power distance culture would have a greater likelihood of negatively rating the contribution relative to 
positively rating it because the negative rating would reaffirm the contributor’s low-status in the existing 
social structure. 
H6: The Matthew effect of the content contributor will be moderated by the power distance 
of the country that the rater identifies with. 
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4 Research Design and Methods 
To test this research model, I downloaded and analyzed a sample of positive and negative ratings in the 
feedback system from posts in the technology industry discussion forum at TPC (pseudonym) (a large public 
electronic knowledge sharing community of software developers). The technology industry discussion forum 
(referred to as the TPC Cubicle in the remainder of the paper) is a forum for members to discuss non-
programming specific topics such as enterprise applications, new product announcements, technology 
consulting, and other technology topics. I selected this discussion forum to maximize the potential 
generalizability of the findings to related electronic social structures, which may not be designed around 
question-and-answer forums but where diverse members may still share a cultural affinity (Arrigara & 
Levina, 2008). 
At the time of the study, the feedback system at TPC allowed any registered member to rate any post either 
up or down in a binary manner, but it did not offer the ability to leave comments along with the rating. TPC 
did not allow anonymous posting or anonymous ratings so anonymity was not a confounding factor in my 
empirical analysis. The feedback system at TPC was fully transparent whereby anybody could view the 
date, the post, and the members involved in the rating interaction. At TPC, each member’s score in the 
feedback system was calculated as the sum of the total positive ratings minus the sum of the total negative 
ratings and was visibly displayed next to all posting activity. This simple subtraction of negative ratings from 
positive ratings is the most common way public electronic knowledge sharing communities determine 
community status and reputation (Barnett et al., 2012; Stewart, 2005). 
To obtain the data, I used a hybrid manual and automated digital collection process whereby I respected 
and followed all of the website’s policies and procedures (Allen, Burk, & Davis, 2006). I downloaded and 
analyzed all rating activity in the feedback system in the TPC Cubicle between March 1 and May 31, 2011. 
This time period represents a typical three-month period in terms of the number of posts that take place in 
the TPC Cubicle3, and this three-month period provided a sufficient sample of positive and negative ratings 
to statistically test my research model. Several ratings contained either a rater or a post author with a blank 
or deleted profile or profiles with unidentified national cultures, so I excluded those interactions from the 
analysis. The final data set included 1,017 ratings (132 negative ratings and 885 positive ratings) across 
520 posts between 786 unique combinations of members with 136 unique post authors’ receiving ratings 
and 153 unique raters, which resulted in 207 unique members in my final sample. The low percentage of 
negative ratings relative to positive ratings is consistent with previous empirical research (Chevalier & 
Mayzlin, 2006; Dellarocas & Wood, 2008; Hu et al., 2009), and the regression models that I used to analyze 
these data do not require the baseline probabilities to be equal (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). 
Table 1. ANOVAs Comparing Missing Data
  
Ratings 
Occupational 
cultural 
differences 
National 
cultural 
distance 
Culture-in-
interaction 
violations 
Power distance
of the rater’s 
national culture 
Between group 
ANOVAs 
Mean square 0.34 0.14 2.25 0.16 145.90 
F 2.96 0.27 1.38 0.66 2.65 
Sig. 0.09 0.60 0.24 0.42 0.10 
Descriptive statistics 
Final sample of 
ratings 
N 1017 1017 1017 520 1017 
Non-centered 
mean 
# Positives: 885 
# Negatives: 132 1.3 0.9 0.2 39.6 
Std. deviation Not applicable 0.7 1.3 0.5 6.9 
Removed from 
sample ratings 
N1 87 29 55 51 73 
Mean # Positives: 70 # Negatives: 17 1.4 1.1 0.2 41.1 
Std. deviation Not applicable 0.7 1.5 0.5 12.7 
1 There were a total of 87 ratings where I could not calculate at least one of the variables, which resulted in my removing those 
data points from the final sample. In 29 out of the 87 bad data points, I could calculate the occupational cultural difference variable, 
in 55 out of the 87 bad data points I could calculate the cultural distance variable, and in 73 out of the 87 bad data points I could 
determine the power distance of the rater’s national culture variable. The 87 ratings with missing data were made across 51 
unique posts. 
                                                     
3 For the seven quarters starting on 1 January, 2010, there were an average of 108 threads and 1,272 posts made by 214 members 
in the TPC Cubicle per quarter. From 1 March, 2011, to 31 May, 2011 (my study’s sampling period), there were 115 threads and 1,460 
posts made by 224 unique members. 
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Given that I had to remove certain data points due to an inability to calculate or code certain variables, I 
tested for a potential selection bias in the final sample using a series of ANOVAs (i.e., testing whether 
excluded rating interactions are statistically different from the included rating interactions). None of the 
ANOVAs revealed significant differences at the 0.05 level (see Table 1 above). Therefore, at least in these 
data during this time period, members who fully filled out their online profiles did not exhibit statistically 
significant different rating practices from those members who did not fully fill out their online profiles. 
Table 2 summarizes the operational definitions of each variable, which I explain in the subsequent sections. 
Table 2. High-level Summary of the Operationalization of Each Hypothesized Variable 
  Operationalization Citation(s) (if applicable) 
Ratings Binary positive (0) or negative (1) rating The feedback system at TPC only allows for non-anonymous binary ratings. 
Culture-in- 
Interaction 
violations 
A sum of the binary evaluation of each culture-in-
interaction dimension (group bonds, 
communication norms, and group boundaries). The 
values range from 0 (no violations) and 3 
(violations along all three culture-in-interaction 
dimensions) 
I used Eliasoph and Lichterman’s (2003) 
conceptual definition but the specific 
instantiation is unique to my study because 
no other paper has used their framework in 
a virtual community. Users of online 
discussion forums and theoretical 
academics further informed this operational 
definition. 
Occupational 
cultural 
differences 
A sum of a binary comparison of the rater and 
receiver of the rating along three dimensions: 
programming paradigm, ideology, and primary 
programming language. The values for this variable 
range from 0 (no differences) to 3 (differences 
along all three dimensions). 
This operational definition is unique to my 
paper. However, certain aspects were 
informed by Barnett et al. (2012), Raymond 
(1999), Spinellis, Drossopoulou, and 
Eisenback (1994), Stewart and Gosain 
(2006), and Trice and Beyer (1993). 
Programmers and technical academics 
provided additional guidance for this 
operational definition. 
National 
cultural 
distance 
, 
where Ikj is the rater’s country score on the kth 
cultural dimension, Iki is the contributor’s country 
score on the kth cultural dimension, and Vk is the 
variance of the kth cultural dimension. I measured 
each of Hofstede’s dimensions of culture at the 
national level using Hofstede’s scores based on the 
country of origin field in each member’s profile. 
Geletkanycz (1997), Mitchell, Smith, 
Seawright, and Morse (2000), and Kogut 
and Singh (1988) 
Power 
distance of 
the rater’s 
national 
culture 
I measured power distance at the national level 
using Hofstede’s scores based on the country of 
origin field in each rater’s profile. 
Geletkanycz (1997) and Mitchell et al. 
(2000) 
Main effect control variables but each are involved in a hypothesized moderating effect 
Contribution 
quality 
Using a three-point scale (-1 for low quality, 0 for 
neither high nor low quality (or not applicable), and 
1 for high quality), three PhD researchers coded 
each post along each of Fichman’s (2011) 
dimensions of quality (accuracy, completeness, 
and verifiability). After coding, I summed the values 
across all three dimensions, which resulted in a 
scale from -3 (low quality on all three dimensions) 
to +3 (high quality on all three dimensions). 
Fichman (2011) but the three-point scale is 
unique to my paper. 
Status of the 
contributor 
Each member’s accumulated score in the feedback 
system (sum of positive ratings minus the sum of 
negative ratings), which I then mapped to TPC’s 
custom clustering of membership. 
This is the status/ranking process of 
members at TPC. Other research by 
Barnett et al. (2012) and Stewart (2005) 
used a similar method. 
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4.1 Culture-in-Interaction 
Determining and coding each post that received a rating against the culture-in-interaction for this forum 
involved two steps: 1) determining each culture-in-interaction dimension of the TPC Cubicle and 2) coding 
each post that received a rating against the culture-in-interaction dimensions. Consistent with the coding 
processes that Strauss and Corbin (1990) outline, two PhD researchers iteratively analyzed all (non-
archived) discussion threads between 1 January and 28 February, 2011, and between 1 June and 31 
August, 2011, in the TPC Cubicle in order to determine each culture-in-interaction dimension. These two 
time periods included 188 discussion threads and 1,805 posts in those discussion threads (61 threads and 
607 posts in the first time period and 127 threads and 1,198 posts in the second time period). 
  Table 3. Culture-in-Interaction of the TPC Cubicle
  Communication norms Group bonds Group boundaries 
Eliasoph and 
Lichterman’s 
(2003) 
conceptual 
definition 
A group's assumptions about what 
appropriate communication is in the 
group context 
A group's assumptions 
about what members' 
mutual responsibilities 
should be while in the 
group context 
A group's assumptions about what the 
group's relationship to the wider world 
should be while in the group context 
Primary 
elements of 
each 
dimension 
1) Posts that are neither excessively 
long nor short  
2) Posts that use minimal chains of 
quotations 
3) Proper punctuation and 
capitalization (within reason)  
4) Cautious use of emoticons  
5) Occasional use of crude/foul 
language 
6) Use of spoiler tags 
7) Matching the title of the thread 
with the purpose 
1) Make insightful 
comments pertaining to 
the topic of the thread 
2) Keep the mood fairly 
light but on point 
3) Not lobby for ratings 
in the feedback system 
(4) Start threads which 
may generate 
significant discussion  
5) Have a degree of 
respect for thread 
participants  
1) Posting topics in the correct forum in 
TPC 
2) Posting links only internal to TPC (i.e., 
no self-referral links or links to competing 
electronic knowledge sharing communities) 
3) Discussing non-technical disciplines as 
inferior to programming 
4) Discussing only ethical issues related to 
the IT discipline (Taboo topics include the 
creation of malware or viruses) 
(5) Correcting code only when asked 
Sample of 
evidence 
Members directly responding to posts that violated the 
communication norms or the group bonds 
1) “We don’t do that around these parts” or “we use spoiler tags 
in here”. 
2) “What’s up with all of the emoticons?” or “what’s up with the 
embedded quotations?”. 
3) Some of the responses used crude/foul language to identify 
that a previous post was out of the norm. This type of foul 
language was used most frequently with posts concerning the 
feedback system and why a particular post received negative 
ratings. 
4) “I stopped reading after the first sentence in that wall of text”. 
Observations 
1) Posts using foul language in order to make a point related to 
the discussion topic were not met with any complaints from other 
members and were common. 
2) Moderators would frequently remark that they changed the 
title of the thread to match the actual topic of the thread. 
3) Members who started discussion threads with minimal 
discussion value were personally attacked (“hey <<expletive>>” 
or “why was this thread started?”). 
Members directly responding to posts 
related to group boundaries 
1) Other threads involved members directly 
commenting about the hubris and egos in 
the programming profession. For example, 
“I don’t want to go into the programming 
forums because I am scared someone will 
think I am dumb”. 
2) Comments such as “did you try posting 
that in one of the java forums where it 
belongs” or “take this thread to the [off-
topic forum]”. 
3) Statements such as “If this were to be 
posted in the HTML/CSS section then that 
action would be warranted if explicitly 
requested”. 
Observations 
1) Links to outside sources were deleted 
and other members would complain about 
such posting activity. 
2) Threads concerning malware or viruses 
revealed that these topics were off limits in 
the TPC Cubicle. 
The two PhD researchers who determined the culture-in-interaction for the forum did so by observing what 
people did in terms of their posts (i.e., use of language, types of topics, and types of responses) and by 
observing what other members said concerning specific posts and their posting styles. For example, 
members would often respond to posts written in “textspeak” format or posts with excessive emoticons with 
comments such as “we don’t do that around these parts” or “what’s up with all of the emoticons?”. Members 
would often explicitly “call out” other members when they did something that was out of the norm. Some of 
the conclusions, however, came from observations and not direct commentary about a behavior. For 
example, the two PhD researchers who determined the culture-in-interaction for the forum observed and 
made conclusions based on member commentary concerning threads written about malware or about 
writing viruses. After the two PhD researchers made all of the conclusions concerning each dimension of 
culture-in-interaction, I discussed the findings with individuals who regularly participate in online discussion 
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forums and with theoretical academics in order to challenge and critically evaluate each culture-in-
interaction dimension. This exercise resulted in another iteration of analysis in order to refine the elements 
of each culture-in-interaction dimension. Table 3 displays the elements of each culture-in-interaction 
dimension. Of the 1,805 posts that I used to determine each culture-in-interaction dimension, 144 violated 
a group bond, 163 violated a communication norm, 112 violated a group boundary, and 1,691 did not violate 
any culture-in-interaction dimension.  
After determining each culture-in-interaction dimension, three PhD researchers coded each post that 
received a rating against each culture-in-interaction dimension in a binary manner. Each dimension was 
independent and a post could violate none or any combination of the three dimensions. The three coders 
coded roughly 10 percent of the posts that received a rating together in order to define and refine the 
systematic coding process, but they found that they needed to further refine the process so they coded an 
additional 20 posts together. This process resulted in 73 total posts coded together. I then created a random 
sample of 100 posts that received ratings that all three coders analyzed and coded independently in order 
to statistically evaluate the reliability of the process (see Table 4). During this step, the three coders 
discussed and resolved any coding discrepancies collectively. If, after discussion, all three coders did not 
come to an agreement, then they used a simple majority to reconcile the differences. I then randomly 
assigned the remaining posts that received ratings to one of the three coders. This coding process resulted 
in 33 posts coded with a group violation, 54 posts coded with a communication norm violation, and 35 posts 
coded with a group boundary violation. Finally, I summed up the binary values to determine the overall 
culture-in-interaction for the particular post. The final variable had a scale of 0 (no violations) to 3 (violations 
of each culture-in-interaction dimension). 
Table 4. Reliability Statistics for Coded Variables
  
  
Sample size Cohen’s kappa (Simple) Krippendorff's alpha Coders 1 & 2 Coders 1 & 3 Coders 2 & 3 
Culture-in-interaction1 
Group bond violations 100 0.78 0.84 0.94 0.85 
Communication norm 
violations 100 0.90 0.91 0.81 0.87 
Group boundary violations 100 0.94 0.81 0.86 0.87 
Contribution quality2 
Accuracy 100 0.90 0.87 0.77 0.84 
Completeness 100 0.89 0.87 0.86 0.88 
Verifiability 100 0.85 0.82 0.92 0.86 
Website-specific factors3 
Humor 100 0.91 0.92 0.83 0.89 
Back on topic 100 0.90 0.82 0.90 0.88 
Programming paradigm 50 0.87 0.91 0.79 0.86 
1 The final culture-in-interaction variable was a sum of the binary values of each of the coded dimensions. Therefore, I calculated 
the reliability statistics for each coded dimension and not for the aggregated variable. 
2 These variables had three possible values (-1, 0, and 1), so these Cohen’s Kappa values were weighted (not simple). The final 
quality variable was the sum of the three coded dimensions, so I calculated the reliability statistics for each coded dimension. 
3 The final website-specific variable was the sum of the two coded dimensions, so I calculated the reliability statistics for each coded 
dimension. 
4.2 Occupational Culture and Degree of Difference 
Through consultation with programmers and technical academics, I used three dimensions (see Table 5) to 
determine each member’s occupational culture: 1) the programming paradigm a particular programmer 
subscribes to, 2) the programmer’s software ideology, and 3) the programmer’s primary programming 
language. Programmers are often protective of their programming paradigm, ideological preferences, and 
dominant programming language (Barnett et al., 2012; Raymond, 1999; Stewart & Gosain, 2006), which 
make them effective dimensions for in-group and out-group comparisons between developers made in the 
context of positive and negative ratings.  
A programming paradigm offers “linguistic abstractions and proof theories for expressing program 
implementations” (Spinellis et al., 1994, p. 191). Each programming paradigm differs in its underlying 
assumptions, the types of programmatic solutions available, and is a defining professional characteristic of 
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a given developer (Spinellis et al., 1994). Three PhD researchers coded the personal profiles of each 
member to determine each member’s programming paradigm using the same process that was used to 
determine the culture-in-interaction violations. They first coded 25 member profiles together to define and 
refine the process. Then, I created a random sample of 50 profiles that each coder independently coded in 
order to statistically evaluate the process, which revealed a highly reliable coding process (see Table 4). 
During this step, any coding discrepancies were discussed and resolved collectively. If, after discussion, all 
three coders did not come to an agreement, then they used a simple majority to reconcile the differences. 
Finally, I randomly assigned the remaining profiles to one of the three coders. 
Trice and Beyer (1993, p. 33) define ideology as “shared, relatively coherently interrelated sets of 
emotionally charged beliefs, values, and norms that bind some people together and help them make sense 
of their worlds.” Examples of two programming ideologies are the commercial approach typically linked with 
the Microsoft community and the open source approach typically linked with the Linux community 
(Raymond, 1999). In my study, I determined a programmer’s dominant ideology using the operating system 
preference field in each member’s personal profile. I chose this field as the ideology proxy for two primary 
reasons. First, programmers who take the time to list an operating system preference subscribe, on at least 
some level, to the set of principles governed by the company that developed the operating system (even if 
they do so begrudgingly). I confirmed this idea through consultation with programmers. Second, the 
operating system preference field is visible when logged-in members read and rate posts. 
Table 5. Sample of Values for Each Dimension of Programming Occupational Culture 
Dimension Sample values Coding details Descriptive statistics 
Programming paradigm: 
captures differences in 
conceptualizing problems and 
general problem classification 
(Spinellis et al., 1994).  
Imperative, 
object 
oriented, 
functional, 
multi-
paradigm 
A combination of the “about 
me” field in the member’s 
profile, the programming 
language field in the member’s 
profile, and posting activity at 
the website (tutorials, code 
snippets, and programming 
forum activity).  
There were 131 developers 
coded as objected oriented, 
37 as imperative, and 39 as 
multi-paradigm in the final 
sample. 
Ideology: captures differences 
in taken-for-granted 
assumptions associated with 
different programming 
ideologies (Raymond, 1999; 
Stewart & Gosain, 2006) 
Microsoft, 
Linux, Mac, 
ideology 
neutral 
Operating system preference 
field in the member’s personal 
profile, which is visible when 
logged-in members view 
contributions. 
In the final sample, 114 
developers identified with the 
Microsoft ideology, 49 with the 
Linux ideology, 16 with the 
Macintosh ideology, and 28 
had no ideology preference.  
Programming languages: 
captures idiosyncratic 
differences associated with 
each programming language 
(Van Roy & Haridi, 2004) 
Java, C#, 
C++, C, VB 
.NET, VB 6.0, 
PHP, and so 
on 
Which forum the member 
spent most of their time based 
on posts displayed in the “view 
posts” link off of each 
member’s personal profile 
page. 
In the final sample, there were 
nine different programming 
languages: C (19), C++ (30), 
C# (50), Clojure (1), Java (61), 
PHP (24), Python (2), VB 
.NET (15), and VB 6.0 (5). 
Any combination of the three dimensions is a member’s occupational culture. For example: 
1. An imperative developer subscribing to the Microsoft ideology whose primary language is VB .NET. 
2. A multi-paradigm developer subscribing to the Linux ideology whose primary language is Java. 
3. An object-oriented developer subscribing to the MAC ideology whose primary language is C++. 
There were 50 unique combinations of the three dimensions among the 207 members in my final sample. 
Each programming language has its own nuances and implementations of certain paradigmatic features, 
which makes creating a direct link between languages and paradigms problematic (Van Roy & Haridi, 2004). 
For instance, constructors (subroutines called when objects get created) written in Java are similar to but 
not identical to constructors written in, say, C++ or C# even though they are all object-oriented programming 
languages. Programmers are also highly protective of their dominant programming language, which makes 
them important elements for minimal in-group and out-group comparisons (Van Roy & Haridi, 2004). I 
confirmed this dominant programming language dynamic by consulting with software developers. In this 
paper, I determined each member’s primary programming language by the programming forum where the 
member had the majority of their posts. 
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After determining each member’s occupational culture along these three dimensions, I compared the rater 
and the author of the post receiving the rating on each dimension (see Equation 1). 
෍݂݅ሺሺܸ݈ܽݑ݁	݂݋ݎ	ܴ݁ܿ݁݅ݒ݁ݎ ݋݂ ݐ݄݁ ܴܽݐ݅݊݃ሻ ൌ ሺܸ݈ܽݑ݁ ݋݂ ݐ݄݁ ܴܽݐ݁ݎሻ, 1,0ሻ
ଷ
௞ୀଵ
 (1) 
A difference score of 3 means that the two programmers had differences on all three dimensions and a 
difference score of 0 means that the two programmers were the same on all three dimensions. 
4.3 National Culture Differences and Hofstede’s Dimensions of Culture 
There is considerable debate in the literature about measuring national culture (Kirkman, Lowe, & Gibson, 
2006; McCoy, Galletta, & King, 2005; Sivakumar & Nakata, 2001). Some scholars argue that culture, 
particularly Hofstede’s dimensions, should be measured at the individual level of analysis (Brockner, 2005; 
Srite & Karahanna, 2006), whereas other scholars including Hofstede are adamantly opposed to measuring 
culture at the individual level (Bochner & Hesketh, 1994; Hofstede, 2001; Palich, Horn, & Griffeth, 1995). 
Part of the contention rests on the definition of Hofstede’s dimensions. For instance, if power distance is 
defined as a property of the culture (i.e., Korea is a high power distance culture), then measuring power 
distance at the individual level may be misleading. However, if power distance is defined as an individual’s 
perception of status inequalities, then measuring power distance at the individual level is justified. Hofstede 
(1980) is clear that the methodological and theoretical underpinnings of his cultural dimensions mean that 
researchers should use his dimensions at the country level and not at the individual level. At the national 
level, Hofstede’s study has been extensively replicated in many contexts using different samples at different 
points in time, which has led multiple researchers to conclude that Hofstede’s reported country scores meet 
rigorous standards of reliability and validity (Geletkanycz, 1997; Kogut & Singh, 1988; Shackleton & Ali, 
1990). Therefore, I use Hofstede’s reported values for each cultural dimension for each member’s identified 
country similar to Geletkanycz (1997), Mitchell et al. (2000), and many others. 
I used the country of origin field in each member’s profile as the national culture proxy, which I then mapped 
to Hofstede’s values for each of his six cultural dimensions. This field, just like the operating system 
preference field, was visible when logged-in members read and rate posts, so raters could visibly see the 
content contributor’s country of origin when making rating decisions. The final sample contained 29 different 
countries, but most of the developers were from the US (125) and Great Britain (27). I mean-centered 
Hofstede’s dimensions in all models in order to reduce the skewness of the values. To determine the degree 
of national cultural differences between the receiver of the rating and the rater’s national culture, I used 
Kogut and Singh’s (1988) measure of cultural distance (see Equation 2).  
, 
(2) 
where Ikj is the rater’s country score on the kth cultural dimension (power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism-collectivism, masculinity-femininity, long-term orientation, and indulgence), Iki is the 
contributor’s country score on the kth cultural dimension, and Vk is the variance of the kth cultural dimension. 
I calculated CDij for each rating interaction in the final sample.  
4.4 Contribution Quality and Status of the Contributor 
Prior literature has established contribution quality and the status of the contributor (Matthew effect) as the 
two primary factors that impact ratings in online feedback systems. Therefore, I control for the main effects 
of these two variables in all of my analysis. Both are also included in a hypothesized interaction effect with 
a cultural variable. 
I determined contribution quality using the dimensions of quality defined by Fichman (2011). Fichman (2011) 
examined contribution quality based on the accuracy (correctness of a statement), completeness 
(thoroughness of the statement), and verifiability (proving a reference to a source) of each answer in her 
study. All three dimensions, however, were not applicable to each post in my sample. For instance, a post 
about Microsoft releasing a product that it did not release could be coded as being factually inaccurate and 
as being verifiable (i.e., this claim can be verified via a quick internet search). However, the completeness 
of this post is not relevant. In other instances, a member may post a well-articulated post that details the 
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member’s opinion about the relevance of certifications for programming careers or a detailed description of 
a personal experience. The accuracy and verifiable nature of the member’s opinion concerning certifications 
and the member’s personal story are not relevant, but the completeness of the response is relevant. 
Therefore, I coded each post that received a rating along each of the three dimensions of quality using a 
three-point scale (-1 for low quality on the dimension, 0 for neither high nor low quality (or not applicable), 
and 1 for high quality on the dimension). I followed the same coding process that I used to code the culture-
in-interaction variables with these quality variables (see Table 4 for reliability statistics). After the three PhD 
researchers coded each post that received a rating along the three dimensions of quality, I summed the 
values across all three dimensions, which resulted in a scale from -3 (low quality on all three dimensions) 
to +3 (high quality on all three dimensions). 
I determined the status of the member whose contribution was rated in two steps. First, I calculated each 
member’s score (sum of total positive ratings minus sum of total negative ratings) in the feedback system 
as of 15 April, 2011, which was the midpoint of the rating observation period. Second, I determined the 
status grouping associated with each score based on TPC’s clustering of membership. During my study’s 
observation period, TPC clustered members with similar scores together (see Table 6). I used the numerical 
value instead of the absolute score in the data analysis due to excessive skewness of the raw scores. 
Table 6. Status of Content Contributor Based on Scores in the Feedback System 
Numerical value Name Score greater than or equal to Score less than 
Number of members 
in the sample 
1 Exiled Not bounded -20 0 
2 Disgraced -20 -10 2 
3 Shunned -10 -5 2 
4 Dishonored -5 0 2 
5 Apprentice 0 5 62 
6 Worker 5 10 16 
7 Tradesman 10 25 20 
8 Craftsman 25 50 17 
9 Whiz 50 100 21 
10 Stalwart 100 250 24 
11 Architect 250 500 17 
12 Enlightened 500 750 8 
13 Master 750 1000 3 
14 Grandmaster 1000 2500 10 
15 Guru 2500 5000 3 
4.5 Control Variables 
Many additional non-quality factors may logically result in either a positive or a negative rating (even though 
they have not been explicitly investigated in the prior literature), so I controlled for the following factors in 
my study: 1) website-specific factors (humor and back on-topic posts), 2) prior positive and negative ratings 
between the rater and the member whose contribution was being rated, 3) friendship between the rater and 
content contributor, 4) the number of prior positive and negative ratings on the post (contribution anchor), 
5) position of the post in the thread (i.e., post near the beginning, middle, or end), and 6) the other Hoftstede 
(2001) dimensions of the rater (discussed previously). 
The TPC Cubicle had website-specific factors that do not fall into any of Fichman’s (2011) dimensions of 
quality but nevertheless impacted the propensity that a contribution would receive a positive or a negative 
rating. These factors included humor and back-on-topic posts. For example, certain threads may have 
begun discussing one topic and ended up discussing a different topic, and a member may have written a 
respectful post that attempts to bring the discussion thread back to its original purpose (back-on-topic posts). 
In the TPC Cubicle, members frequently commented about their appreciation for those types of posts and 
often rewarded those posts with positive ratings. I followed the same coding process that I used to code the 
culture-in-interaction variables with these two website-specific variables. These two variables were highly 
correlated (i.e., humorous posts were often posts that attempted to bring a thread back on topic in my 
sample of posts), so I aggregated these variables into a single website-specific variable that had a minimum 
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value of 0 (neither humorous nor back-on-topic posts) and a maximum value of 2 (both humorous and back-
on-topic posts). 
I used two binary variables to account for the past rating history between two members: 1) previous negative 
rating and 2) previous positive rating. I determined both by examining all previous ratings (not time bound) 
for both the rater and the author whose contribution was being rated. If the rater was previously negatively 
(positively) rated by the current member who was being rated at any point previously, then I set the negative 
(positive) rating binary variable to 1 (otherwise it was set to 0). TPC also had a section where members can 
“friend” each other similar to Facebook and other social networking websites, so there was a distinct 
possibility that friends had a lower propensity to negatively rate each other. For each rating interaction, I 
checked the friend’s section of the website to determine if the two members were friends. I set this binary 
variable to 1 if the two members were friends and to 0 if the two members were not friends. 
In addition to anchoring on the high or low status of the post author, raters could anchor on previous ratings 
on a given contribution (post). To control for this alternative explanation, I calculated the number of previous 
negative ratings and the number of previous positive ratings on each post at the time of the rating interaction. 
Along these same lines, there could have been a “recency” effect whereby contributions at the start of a 
discussion thread may have had a more or less likelihood of being rated positively relative to posts at the 
end of a discussion thread. To control for this effect, I calculated a simple ratio of the position of the post 
relative to the number of posts (at the time of the rating interaction) in a given discussion thread. 
5 Results 
No single unit of analysis exists with a positive or a negative rating because each rating is embedded in the 
context of a post, the giver of feedback (rater), the receiver of feedback (author of the post being rated), and 
the national and occupational culture of both the rater and the receiver of feedback. As such, I used a cross-
nested three-level hierarchical linear model (HLM) to analyze these data instead of a single level OLS 
regression (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). Figure 2 displays the three-level cross-nested structure that I used to 
analyze these ratings data. Although displayed in Figure 2 as dotted lines, there is no community culture in 
the final cross-nested HLM models because I only analyzed a single website (n = 1). Therefore, all posts, 
raters, and receivers of feedback were embedded in the same culture-in-interaction.  
 
Figure 2. Three-level Cross-nested Structure 
The dependent variable in all of the models was binary where a 0 represented a positive rating and a 1 
represented a negative rating, so the dependent variable was the log odds of a negative rating (logit(P)). 
Therefore, I could not estimate the level-1 residual variances due to the binary nature of the dependent 
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variable. However, I assumed that all of the level-2 and level-3 random effects (random intercepts only) had 
a multivariate normal distribution for each level-2 and level-3 factor (respectively), which is reasonable given 
the relatively large sample size and low standardized skew and kurtosis index values for the level-2 and 
level-3 continuous variables and random effects (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). 
I used a residual pseudo-likelihood estimation technique to run each model in order to reduce the bias 
associated with determining fixed-effect estimates using maximum likelihood estimators. I also ran each 
model using a different variance component for each random effect and a between-within denominator 
degrees of freedom option, which splits the residual degrees of freedom into between-subject and within-
subject portions. Finally, I used the iterative Newton-Raphson optimization technique to converge each 
model to a solution. This technique provides standard errors based on observed information as opposed to 
expected information in addition to using the shape of the likelihood function to find parameter values closer 
to the maximum (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). 
Table 7 displays the descriptive statistics for the independent variables for the 1,017 rating interactions. 
Contribution quality and the status of the receiver of feedback had a low correlation, which means that 
members of all status groups contributed high-quality content in my sample. Therefore, any main effect of 
the contributor’s status on the probability of a negative rating cannot simply be explained by simply 
concluding that higher status members of the community contribute “better” (higher-quality) contributions 
relative to lower status members of the community. The status of the receiver of feedback and culture-in-
interaction violations also had a low correlation, which means high-status members of the community had 
a similar likelihood of violating the website’s culture-in-interaction as low-status members of the community 
(in my sample). The Hofstede dimensions had the highest statistically significant correlations in my sample, 
but all variance inflation factors (VIFs) were lower than the common cutoff rules of thumb (O'Brien, 2007).  
   Table 7. Descriptive Statistics at the Rating Level
Variable (abbreviation) Mean Std. deviation 
Culture-in-interaction violations 0.29 0.56 
Status of the contributor 10.7 3.2 
National culture distance 0.88 1.26 
Occupational cultural differences 1.3 0.72 
Friends1 0s = 836 1s = 181 
Prior positive rating relationship1 0s = 674 1s = 343 
Prior negative rating relationship1 0s = 946 1s = 71 
Post positioning 0.40 0.32 
Number of prior positive ratings on the post 1.30 3.20 
Number of prior negative ratings on the post 0.21 1.00 
Site-specific factors 0.13 0.34 
Contribution/Post quality 0.90 1.25 
Power distance (PDI)2 0.13 7.71 
Individualism-collectivism (IND)2 -4.91 14.5 
Masculinity-femininity (MAS)2 -2.57 11.59 
Uncertainty avoidance (UAI)2 -0.40 9.84 
Long-term orientation (LTO)2 5.57 10.80 
Indulgence (INDULG)2 -0.53 5.56 
1 For all binary variables, the 0s represent “no” and the 1s represent “yes”. 
2 Mean centered variable so the descriptive statistics were for the mean-centered values. 
Table 8 displays the solutions for all HLM regression models that I used to test my research hypotheses.  
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Table 8. HLM Model Results
  
Model 1 
method=rspl 
type=vc 
ddfm=bw 
Model 2 
method=rspl 
type=vc 
ddfm=bw 
Model 3 
method=rspl 
type=vc 
ddfm=bw 
Model 4 
method=rspl 
type=vc 
ddfm=bw 
Model 5 
method=rspl 
type=vc 
ddfm=bw 
Model 6 
method=rspl 
type=vc 
ddfm=bw 
Model 7 
method=rspl 
type=vc 
ddfm=bw 
Fixed effects Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
Intercept -2.43*** -2.07*** 0.42 -2.31* -3.06* -2.38* -2.30* 
Culture-in-interaction 
(CINI)    1.99*** 3.19*** 2.21*** 2.03*** 
National cultural 
distance 
   0.35* 0.35* 0.33 0.33 
Occupational cultural 
distance (OCD) 
   0.57* 1.02** 0.59* 0.58* 
(CINI) * (OCD)     -0.82*   
(CINI) * (post quality)      -0.73*  
(Receiver status) * 
(PDI)       0.02* 
Receiver status   -0.25** -0.17* -0.16* -0.18* -0.17* 
Prior + ratings on the 
post   -0.15 -0.11 -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 
Prior - ratings on the 
post   0.49** 0.36* 0.40* 0.34* 0.40* 
Post quality  -0.83*** -0.80*** -0.70** -0.70** -0.40 -0.73** 
Friends   -2.31** -2.62** -2.84** -2.69** -2.27** 
Post position   -0.22 -0.24 -0.27 -0.13 -0.16 
Prior + rating 
relationship 
  -0.48 -0.55 -0.09 -0.10 -0.75 
Prior - rating 
relationship 
  1.83** 1.99** 0.40* 0.34* 1.96** 
Website-specific 
factors 
  -0.007 0.002 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 
PDI   -0.11 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.28* 
IND   -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 
MAS   0.06 0.08* 0.07 0.08* 0.08* 
UAI   0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 
LTO   -0.01 -0.01 -0.008 -0.01 -0.02 
INDULG   -0.08 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.004 
* Significant at 0.05, ** Significant at 0.01, *** Significant at < 0.001 
Random effects Variance component 
Variance 
component 
Variance 
component 
Variance 
component 
Variance 
component 
Variance 
component 
Variance 
component 
L2 intercept (receiver) 1.59 1.41 0.46 0.12 0.17 0.11 0.12 
L2 intercept (rater) 0.06 0.12 0.16 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.20 
L2 intercept (post) 1.24 0.93 1.11 0.95 0.92 0.93 1.00 
L3 intercept 
(rater national culture) 0.05 0.10 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.18 
L3 intercept (rater occ. 
culture) 0.10 0.10 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.18 
L3 intercept (receiver 
national culture) 0.44 0.57 0.29 0.18 0.11 0.19 0.20 
L3 intercept (receiver 
occ. culture) 0.60 0.57 0.28 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 
Model fit 
-2 residual log 
pseudo-likelihood 5,484.35 5,782.41 6,350.88 6,697.22 6,842.84 6,678.94 6,763.29 
Explained variance1  10.4% 17.8% 
25.1% 
42.8% 
33.7% 
57.7% 
34.0% 
58.1% 
33.4% 
57.1% 
33.1% 
56.6% 
1 I calculated the top percentage estimate using the following formula proposed by Snijders and Bosker (2012): 1 - sum(variance 
components for the Model + (π^2)/3) / sum(variance components for the Null model + (π^2)/3). I calculated the bottom percentage by 
removing the (π^2)/3 level-one logit(P) estimator from the formula. 
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Due to the binary nature of the outcome variable, I calculated the nesting effect (a pseudo intra-class 
correlation coefficient (ICC)) by estimating the variance of the logistic function (level 1) using (π^2)/3 and 
using the squared covariance parameter estimates for levels 2 and 3 (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). Using this 
method with the unconstrained null model (Model 1), the level-1 rating (41 percent), the level-2 receiver of 
the rating (32 percent), and the level-2 post (19 percent) had the greatest ICCs. The overall level-2 ICC in 
the unconstrained model was roughly 51 percent and the overall level-3 ICC was 7 percent, which is 
evidence supporting the use of this nesting structure. Model 1 also indicated that the probability that a 
random post posted by a random member from a random occupational culture and random national culture 
would receive a negative rating (relative to a positive rating) from a random rater from a random occupational 
culture and random national culture was 8.1 percent4. 
In order to explain rating behaviors above, beyond, or instead of contribution quality using cultural variables 
at the national, occupational, and community levels, I first had to establish a baseline for the quality effect 
in rating practices. Model 2 provided this baseline by regressing logit(P) of negative ratings on just the post 
quality independent variable. Model 2 had a pseudo R2 of approximately 10 percent. This result means that, 
in my sample of ratings, roughly 10 percent of the variance in logit(P) of negative ratings relative to positive 
ratings could be explained by just contribution quality. Model 2 also demonstrated empirically that the quality 
variable was statistically significant in the proper direction (i.e., low-quality posts had a higher probability of 
being negatively rated relative to high-quality posts). Therefore, quality posts had the desired effect, but the 
model only explained approximately 10 percent of the sample variance in rating practices, so there were 
many other factors involved in determining why a post received either a positive or a negative rating. 
Model 3 contained the remainder of the control variables. This model had a pseudo R2 of roughly 25 percent. 
Adding in the culture variables in Models 4-7 added between 8 and 9 percent of additional explained 
variance. Model 4 tested the H1, H2, and H3 main effects. For a post that did not violate the culture-in-
interaction of the forum while holding all other covariates constant at 0, there was a 9 percent probability 
that the post would get negatively rated. However, a post that violated a single culture-in-interaction 
dimension (increasing the culture-in-interaction variable from 0 to 1) while holding all other covariates 
constant at 0 increased the probability of a negative rating from 9 to 42 percent. This probability increased 
to 97 percent when a post violated all three culture-in-interaction dimensions. Therefore, the Model 4 results 
supported the hypothesized main effect of culture-in-interaction violations on the probability of a negative 
rating interaction (H1). 
Model 4 also supported the hypothesized effect of occupational cultural differences between the rater and 
the receiver of the rating on the probability of a negative rating (H2), but the effect was not as strong as with 
posts that violated the culture-in-interaction of the forum. When the rater and the receiver of the rating 
differed on a single occupational cultural dimension while holding all other covariates constant at 0, the 
probability of a negative rating increased from 9 to 14.9 percent. The probability of a negative rating 
increased to 35 percent when the rater and the receiver of the rating differed on all three occupational 
cultural dimensions (while holding all other covariates constant at 0). 
Additionally, Model 4 supported the hypothesized effect of national cultural distance between the rater’s 
national culture and the rating receiver’s national culture on the probability of a negative rating (H3). 
Increasing the national cultural distance between the rater’s and the rating receiver’s national culture by one 
unit while holding all other covariates constant at 0 increased the probability of a negative rating from 9 to 
12 percent. A two-unit increase in cultural distance increased the probability of a negative rating to 16.6 
percent (while holding all other covariates constant at 0). 
However, the occupational cultural differences variable and the culture-in-interaction violation variable were 
part of a significant higher-order interaction effect (H4) in Model 5 (see Figure 3). In Model 5, the effect of 
small occupational cultural differences on the probability of a negative rating was enhanced when the post 
violated one or more of the culture-in-interaction dimensions. For instance, when the occupational cultural 
differences between the rater and the receiver of the rating were along a single dimension (difference score 
of 1) while holding all other covariates constant at 0, the probability of a negative rating was 5.5 percent 
when the post did not violate any culture-in-interaction dimension. However, that 5.5 percent probability 
increased to 38 percent when the post violated a single culture-in-interaction dimension and 87 percent 
                                                     
4 I calculated all reported probabilities in this section using both the intercept and the parameter estimates. I had to include the intercept 
because that provides the baseline when the variable of interest was 0. The formula is as follows: exp(intercept + (parameter 
estimate)*(value)) / (1+ exp(intercept + (parameter estimate)*(value))). 
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when the post violated two culture-in-interaction dimensions. In other words, small occupational cultural 
differences went relatively unnoticed until the post violated one or more of the culture-in-interaction 
dimensions. Therefore, Model 5 provided empirical support for the H4 moderating hypothesis.  
Figure 3. Interaction of Culture-In-Interaction Violations and Occupational Cultural Differences 
Models 2-4 established the negative main effect of contribution quality on the probability of negative ratings, 
but Model 6 demonstrated that post quality was part of a statistically significant higher-order interaction 
effect with the culture-in-interaction violation variable (see Figure 4). In this model, low-quality posts (quality 
score of -2) had a 7.7 percent probability of a negative rating when the post did not violate the culture-in-
interaction of the website (while holding all other covariates at 0). However, once that low-quality post 
(quality score of -2) also violated one of the culture-in-interaction dimensions (increasing the culture-in-
interaction variable from 0 to 1), the probability of a negative rating increased to 76.6 percent (while holding 
all other covariates at 0). The effect was in the same direction for high-quality posts but the magnitude of 
the effect was less dramatic. For instance, a high-quality post (quality score of 2) without a culture-in-
interaction violation had a 1.7 percent probability of a negative rating, but, when that same high-quality post 
violated all three culture-in-interaction dimensions, the probability of a negative rating increased to 13.8 
percent (while holding all other covariates at 0). Therefore, Model 6 provided empirical support for the H5 
moderating hypothesis.  
 
Figure 4. Interaction of Post Quality and Culture-in-Interaction Violations 
Models 3 and 4 demonstrated that the rating receiver’s status in TPC was negatively correlated with the 
probability of a negative rating. This negative correlation means that the higher the receiver’s status in TPC, 
the less likely the receiver was to receive a negative rating even after controlling for contribution quality. 
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This finding provides strong evidence supporting the contributor anchor and resulting Matthew effect. Model 
7, however, further demonstrated empirically that this Matthew effect was qualified by the power distance 
of the rater’s national culture (see Figure 5). Raters from low power distance national cultures relative to 
high power distance national cultures had a greater probability of giving a negative rating even after 
controlling for the quality of the contribution, previous rating history, friendship between the two individuals 
involved in the rating interaction, and previous ratings on the contribution.  
For instance, raters from low power distance national cultures had a 74 percent probability of giving a 
negative rating to a low-status content contributor (member of the disgraced status group), whereas raters 
from high power distance national cultures had less than a 1 percent probability of giving a post authored 
by that same member of the disgraced status group a negative rating (while keeping all other covariates 
constant at 0). For posts authored by high-status members of the community (member of the Stalwart 
group), raters from high power distance national cultures had almost a 0 percent probability of negatively 
rating them, whereas raters from low power distance national cultures had roughly a 2 percent probability 
of negatively rating them (while keeping all other covariates constant at 0). In these data, all raters showed 
a deference to high-status content contributors (even after controlling for content quality and the other 
control variables), but raters from low power distance national cultures showed less deference relative to 
raters from higher power distance national cultures. Therefore, the hypothesized moderating effect of power 
distance was greater for low-status content contributors (poor getting poorer) than for high-status content 
contributors (rich getting richer), but Model 7 still generally support the hypothesized effect. 
Figure 5. Interaction of Power Distance and Contributor’s Status 
Three of the control variables (besides contribution quality and receiver status) were consistently significant 
with meaningful effect sizes. First, friendship between the rater and the receiver of the rating had a strong 
negative effect. In Model 3, for instance, friends had roughly a 13 percent probability of negative rating each 
other but non-friends had close to a 60 percent probability of negatively rating each other (while keeping all 
other covariates constant at 0). Second, I found a strong positive effect when the rater and the receiver of 
the rating had a prior negative rating relationship. In Model 4, for instance, a prior negative rating relationship 
resulted in a 42 percent probability of a negative rating versus only a 9 percent probability when there was 
not a previous negative rating relationship (while keeping all other covariates constant at 0). Therefore, 
members used the feedback system to extract revenge from prior negative ratings even when controlling 
for contribution quality, but prior positive ratings did not have the reverse effect. Finally, all models showed 
statistically significant evidence of a negative contribution (post) anchoring effect. Prior negative ratings on 
a contribution (post) resulted in an increased probability of additional negative ratings on a contribution even 
after controlling for contribution quality. Table 9 shows the conclusions in relation to the stated hypotheses 
even when controlling for these robust set of alternative explanations. 
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Table 9. Hypothesis Conclusions
Hypothesis Conclusion 
H1: Culture-in-interaction violations (main effects) Supported in Models 4-7 but the main effect was qualified by occupational cultural differences (Model 5).  
H2: Occupational culture differences (main effects) Supported in Models 4-7 but the main effect was qualified by 
culture-in-interaction violations (Model 5). 
H3: Cultural distance between rater’s and contributor’s 
national culture 
Supported in Models 4 and 5 at the 0.05 level and weakly 
supported at the 0.1 level in Models 6 & 7. 
H4: Interaction of culture-in-interaction violations and 
occupational culture differences Supported in Model 5. 
H5: Interaction of culture-in-interaction violations and 
contribution quality Supported in Model 6. 
H6: Interaction of power distance and contributor’s status 
The moderating effect of power distance was greater for low-status 
content contributors (poor getting poorer) than for high-status 
content contributors (rich getting richer). Regardless, Model 7 
generally supported this moderating hypothesis. 
5.1 Alternative Interaction Effects 
I tested several alternative interaction effects to rule out possible alternative explanations. Due to space 
limitations, Table 8 omits these models. First, it is possible that quality posts authored by high-status 
members of TPC were rewarded more than quality posts authored by low-status members of the community. 
If true, then it would qualify the conclusions that I made concerning the quality by culture-in-interaction 
violation moderating H5. To test this alternative explanation, I ran a model with all variables from Model 4 
plus an interaction effect of contribution quality and the rating receiver’s status. This model revealed a non-
statistically significant interaction effect. This non-statistically significant interaction effect means that my 
sample of raters rewarded high-quality posts with a reduced probability of receiving a negative rating 
(relative to a positive rating) in a consistent manner for members across all status groups (from Exiled to 
Guru). Second, to further evaluate the robustness of the hypothesized culture-in-interaction by quality 
moderating effect, I tested a three-way interaction between contribution quality, the status of the content 
contributor, and culture-in-interaction violations with all of the variables from Model 4. This three-way 
interaction effect in this model was not statistically significant, which means that status was not a 
confounding factor to the hypothesized two-way interaction effect of contribution quality and culture-in-
interaction violations. 
Third, to evaluate whether contribution quality was a confounding factor for the power distance moderating 
hypothesis (H6), I tested a model with a three-way interaction effect (power distance, contributor status, and 
contribution quality) with all variables from Model 4. This model revealed a non-significant three-way 
interaction effect. Therefore, the significant interaction effect shown in Figure 5 (Model 7) cannot be 
explained by contribution quality differences between posts made by members of different status groups. 
Finally, I tested several different interaction effects of each of the other Hofstede dimensions of national 
culture and contributor status or contribution quality in an exploratory manner. None of those two-way 
interaction effects (i.e., each Hoftsede dimension by quality and each Hoftstede dimension by contributor 
status interaction effects) were statistically significant. These results mean that power distance was the only 
significant national culture moderator in my sample of ratings. 
6 Discussion and Conclusion 
Feedback systems serve an important purpose for a wide variety of virtual environments from commercial 
to social to learning (Adler, Alfaro, Kulshreshtha, & Pye, 2011; Aral, 2014; Josang, Ismail, & Boyd, 2007). 
However, the usefulness of accumulated positive and negative ratings largely depends on how much noise 
(i.e., ratings not based on quality) the overall ratings contain (Chen et al., 2011; Khansa, Ma, Liginlal, & Kim, 
2015; Poston & Speier, 2005). For instance, TripAdvisor, Yelp, or Amazon ratings that are based on 
personnel, social, or cultural factors and not on the quality of the product or service limit the usefulness of 
those reviews, which is problematic for both the buyer (not resolving seller uncertainty) and the seller (not 
being properly rewarded for having a superior product or service). In public electronic knowledge sharing 
communities, ratings that do not represent quality pose a significant risk for both the knowledge seeker and 
the knowledge contributor. The knowledge seeker may learn unsound practices concerning the skill-based 
craft due to the poor signal that the noisy ratings provide (Cheng & Vassileva, 2005), while highly 
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knowledgeable content contributors may stop contributing due to their high-quality contributions’ not being 
positively rated or even being negatively rated (Lampe & Resnick, 2004). 
Yet, prior literature has reported minimal theoretical or empirical research explaining why something gets 
positively or negatively rated. In this paper, I suggest that cultural factors at a variety of levels are a 
significant source of rating’s noise because different cultures may embrace or avoid conflict, may have 
different levels of respect for authority, and may have different attitudes towards publicly downgrading 
(negative ratings) or praising (positive ratings) other members in the feedback system. On Amazon, for 
instance, consumers from all over the world provide ratings, and, on www.codeproject.com, raters from 
many different national and occupational cultures rate each other. Given cultural differences on a variety of 
dimensions, it is not surprising that culture (at a variety of levels) may have an adverse direct and mitigating 
impact on rating practices.  
The good news is that my results demonstrate empirically that quality is an important predictor of the 
probability that a contribution will receive negative and positive ratings. Quality by itself explained roughly 
10 percent of the variance in rating practices with a strong effect size in the expected direction (i.e., low-
quality posts had a higher probability of receiving negative ratings). However, the bad news is that my results 
also demonstrate empirically that the impact of quality on the probability of negative and positive ratings 
was significantly moderated by culture-in-interaction violations. Posts that violated the culture-in-interaction 
of the forum removed most of the quality effect. Additionally, a greater percentage of the explained variance 
in the probability (Logit(P) to be more precise) of negative and positive ratings were based on occupational 
and national cultural similarities or differences between the rater and the receiver of the rating, previous 
interaction histories between dyadic pairs of members, adherence or a lack of adherence to the forum’s 
culture-in-interaction, friendships, the social status of the receiver of the rating, and the power distance of 
the rater’s country of origin. The cultural variables explained between 8 and 9 percent of the variability in 
rating practices in my sample, while the other social factors (i.e., friendship, prior rating history, Matthew 
effect of the contribution, and the Matthew effect of the contributor) explained close to 15 percent of the 
variance in the reported models. Therefore, my study demonstrates empirically several sources of ratings 
noise including a variety of cultural effects. 
6.1 Theoretical Contributions and Future Research 
Much of the literature on online feedback systems in a variety of contexts has focused on explaining the 
impact that ratings in these systems have on a variety of social and economic outcomes (Ba & Pavlou, 
2002; Chen et al., 2011; Chevalier & Mayzlin, 2006; Dellarocas, 2006; Godes & Silva, 2012; Pavlou & 
Dimoka, 2006; Poston & Speier, 2005; Son et al., 2006). Far less literature has investigated why something 
gets positively or negatively rated online. My paper helps to close this gap by using a cultural theoretical 
lens to explain a portion of the ratings noise, specifically in public electronic knowledge sharing communities. 
In order to understand the meaning of accumulated ratings, my results suggest that information consumers 
need to understand the culture-in-interaction of the community, the occupational culture that the community 
is situated in, and the national cultures of the membership. Culture at each of these levels interact in unique 
ways to either directly impact or qualify the impact of other factors (quality and the Matthew effect) on rating 
practices. However, just because an electronic environment is culturally diverse does not necessarily mean 
that my proposed research model will be applicable. As such, a fruitful area of future research could 
investigate these cultural effects in other culturally diverse contexts (eCommerce, electronic knowledge 
sharing in other industries, or social sites such as Facebook or Baidu) in order to test the generalizability of 
my findings (Lee & Baskerville, 2003).  
These cultural factors involved in ratings suggest that referring to online feedback systems as “reputation 
systems” may be a bit of a misnomer, particularly in culturally diverse settings. By definition, reputation is a 
measure of quality (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Washington & Zajac, 2005), but my study demonstrates 
empirically that ratings in these systems are a function of many additional social and cultural variables. This 
empirical finding may be one of the reasons why the prior literature reports inconsistent findings when 
empirically evaluating the reputation effect of online ratings in a variety of different contexts (Ba & Pavlou, 
2002; Ghose et al., 2006; Kauffman & Wood, 2005). If, for instance, quality explains only 20 percent of the 
variance in a rating, then it is not surprising that previous literature has reported conflicting results because 
80 percent of the rating relates to factors not associated with reputation. Instead of or in addition to 
reputation, these feedback systems may be measuring status, popularity, in-group versus out-group 
dynamics, social and cultural similarities and differences, or something else entirely. My results suggest 
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future research that investigates this type of reputation effect must first statistically determine what 
percentage of the ratings are due to quality and then use that component in their predictive models. 
6.2 Practical Implications 
Feedback systems in public electronic knowledge sharing communities rarely have algorithms that filter 
ratings in or out by, for instance, accounting for the social or cultural context surrounding the rating 
interaction. Instead, typical feedback systems opt for an unfiltered, uncensored approach whereby all 
members may participate and all ratings count towards a member’s total score. On the surface, this strategy 
seems like an effective one, but my study demonstrates empirically that many positive and negative ratings 
are noisy. To reduce this noise, feedback systems could incorporate social and occupational cultural factors 
into their design. For example, feedback systems can implement an algorithm that determines the probability 
of negative or positive ratings between dyadic pairs of members based on the practice-related data entered 
in each member’s profile and previous rating history of all members (as I did in my study but in an automated 
manner). Based on these probabilities, which will inevitably vary from website to website and will change as 
new ratings are entered into the system, the algorithm may reduce noisy ratings by only counting a portion 
of those ratings (based on the probabilities) towards a member’s total score. 
The strong effect of culture-in-interaction violations provides website administrators with a bit of a 
conundrum. This finding may, on the one hand, be a positive appropriation of the feedback system because 
the negative ratings may ensure that new members learn the social dynamics, tone of the discussion forum, 
group boundaries, and overall assumptions related to participation in the particular group before posting in 
a given forum. This type of system usage may prevent certain disruptions to the dynamics of the electronic 
knowledge sharing community due to members’ not understanding what it means to be a part of the group. 
On the other hand, however, punishing culture-in-interaction violations this severely may make the 
electronic knowledge sharing community less open to outsiders because outsiders may be afraid to 
participate for fear of being publicly downgraded in the feedback system. Consequently, this type of usage 
of the feedback system may promote lurking or hinder the growth of certain electronic social structures. 
Website administrators may want to explicitly state the expectations of member conduct in the specific forum 
in an about page so newcomers can learn the community’s culture without having to lurk for an excessively 
long period of time before posting. 
6.3 Limitations 
Like all research, my empirical investigation has limitations. First, I theorize about how these types of 
systems are being used (i.e., actual ratings) and not system non-usage (i.e., members’ choosing not to rate 
a specific post). Therefore, all reported probabilities were for a negative rating relative to a positive rating. 
A given member, however, may choose not to rate a post (third option) for a similar or a different set of 
factors than the factors that I propose in this paper. For example, occupational cultural similarities and 
differences may only become salient after the decision to rate has already been made. For non-raters, these 
differences may not be noticeable. Investigating non-raters would be an interesting future study that would 
certainly add to my proposed model. 
Second, I make no claims that the three elements in my operational definition of an individual’s programming 
occupational culture represent a complete list. Programming paradigm, ideology, and dominant 
programming language represent three measurable dimensions associated with an individual’s 
programming occupational culture. Other elements would certainly include (among others) the type of 
company, the types of projects, the software development model (agile versus waterfall), and the structure 
of the development environment that a programmer works in. Testing the effect of more dimensions such 
that the range of difference scores between dyadic pairs of members increases from zero to three to, say, 
from zero to eight or 10 would be a worthwhile future study. Regardless, my study does provide empirical 
evidence that occupational cultural differences along at least these three dimensions are important factors 
in predicting ratings. 
Third, my study is situated in a single, diverse field in a single occupational culture. TPC has forums that 
span the spectrum of programming paradigms and ideologies in the occupational culture of software 
development. Consequently, no dominant occupational group exists in this public electronic knowledge 
sharing community because members have many different occupational cultural backgrounds. As such, it 
is reasonable to posit that the impact that occupational cultural differences has on rating practices may be 
greater in a website such as Microsoft’s Channel 9 or the Java OTN Forums. For example, a Java/Linux 
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developer may be met with much less cordiality at Channel 9 than at TPC due to Channel 9’s being 
presumably dominated by .NET/Microsoft developers. Future research could look to empirically test and 
possibly extend my proposed model by investigating an electronic knowledge sharing community with 
clearly defined dominant groups of members based on their occupational cultures. 
Fourth, my paper demonstrates that culture is a significant source of noise in ratings. Culture, however, is 
certainly not the only source of noise as demonstrated by the significant effects of several of the non-quality 
control variables. Future research could add to this model by investigating other social factors such as 
network structures and network positioning on the propensity to give and receive positive or negative ratings. 
Different network structures may promote the flow of information more efficiently than others (Reagans & 
McEvily, 2003; Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001), which may increase or decrease these cultural effects or 
may introduce additional main effects to this model. Future research could also further investigate culture-
in-interaction violations by theorizing and testing the effects of each culture-in-interaction dimension 
separately instead of aggregating the violations to the culture-in-interaction level. These types of correlations 
may provide additional theoretical and empirical insights into the reasons why a contribution is rated the 
way that it is rated. 
Finally, the website that I investigated did not allow either anonymous postings or anonymous ratings (at 
the time I conducted the study), but other websites may allow for anonymous posting and/or anonymous 
ratings. An interesting future study could investigate the potential mediating or moderating role that 
anonymity has on rating practices. For example, the impact of national cultural distance or occupational 
cultural differences on the probability of negative ratings may logically be mitigated by anonymity because 
not posting the names of the raters or the receivers of the ratings may reduce the impact that respect for 
authority or minimal group categorizations along occupational cultural dimensions has on rating practices. 
Furthermore, individuals from high power distance national cultures may be less worried about being 
deferential to high-status members in the community if the ratings were partially or completely anonymous. 
Investigating anonymity would certainly make for an interesting extension to my proposed cultural effects. 
6.4 Conclusion 
Why contributions get rated positively or negatively may often appear to be irrational and arbitrary, 
particularly in public electronic knowledge sharing communities. For example, consider the following 
exchange: 
Member 1: Posts a discussion topic or a question 
Member 2: Posts a well-articulated and insightful response 
Member 3: Posts a simple “I agree” with nothing new 
In this exchange, member 2 may receive a combination of positive and negative ratings for their well-
articulated and insightful contribution, while member 3 may receive mostly positive ratings for their rather 
bland contribution. Based on my theoretical analysis and empirical results, it could be that member 3 was 
rated more positively because the individuals who chose to rate member 3’s contribution were 
occupationally similar to member 3, were from similar national countries, and/or were from high power 
distance national cultures. It is also possible that member 2’s contribution violated the culture-in-interaction 
of the forum (even though it was a high-quality contribution), which may have resulted in a higher propensity 
for the contribution to receive negative as opposed to positive ratings. Furthermore, the members who rated 
member 2’s contribution may have come from lower power distance cultures, which may have resulted in a 
greater likelihood that they would give negative ratings relative to positive ratings. My theoretical analysis 
and empirical results suggest that it is not enough to look at contribution quality in isolation when evaluating 
these ratings. It is further necessary to contextualize the rating in the context of social and cultural attributes 
of the rater and the receiver of the rating along with the culture-in-interaction of the forum.
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